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Abstract 
 
     The development of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) has been a great 
achievement in the world of micro-electronics.  One of these devices can be programmed 
to replace the need for thousands of individual specialized devices.  Despite their great 
versatility, FPGAs are still extremely vulnerable to radiation from cosmic waves in 
space.  Extensive research has been conducted to examine how radiation disrupts FPGAs.  
This research incorporates and enhances current methods of radiation detection.  The 
stuck-at fault model and delay model are used to represent common radiation induced 
issues, single event efects and total ionizing dose respectively.   
     An active sensor network design is created that has the ability to detect flipped bits 
and delay errors caused by radiation along with their location, amount and duration.  All 
of this is accomplished and reported in real time.  During this research, total ionizing 
dose errors are successfully modeled, detected, quantified and reported.  The single event 
effect detection method is also a success, but is not validated in a radiation environment.  
More testing is required, but once that is done this system can be incorporated to enhance 
current FPGA reconfiguration methods that automatically place application logic away 
from failing sections of the FPGA.  This system has great potential to become a valuable 
tool in fault mitigation.     
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RADIATION INDUCED FAULT DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS, AND 
CHARACTERIZATION ON FPGAS 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
     Recently, the introduction of Field Programmable Gate Arrays has allowed 
developers to replace several different specialized circuitry with one dynamic device.  
FPGAs implement reprogrammable logic to take the form of any number of devices an 
unlimited number of times.  The versatility of FPGAs has made them a very desirable 
tool for multiple platforms [1]; one of which being space operations.  While normal 
conditions pose little threat to a FPGA device, radiation present in the space environment 
is another story.  Radiation can cause numerous different types of failures on these 
devices.  These failures range from localized, temporary failures in which incorrect 
values traverse throughout a logic circuit to failures characterized by poor performance 
and speed degradation.  In any case, these failures cause unwanted effects that can lead to 
major damage of other systems dependent upon the FPGA.  Therefore, understanding the 
effects of radiation on FPGAs is becoming very important.   
1.1 Motivation  
     The study of the behavior of electronics in a space environment is crucial for reliable 
operation.  One technique of protecting circuits from radiation is adding a physical layer 
of protection to make it radiation hardened.  While this method is effective, it is also very 
costly [2].  This is why recent efforts have included incorporating the adaptive nature and 
small feature size of the FPGA to design circuits that are more fault-resistant.  FPGAs 
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also offer the versatility to create a platform that can characterize and evaluate the 
damaging effects of radiation.  Studies have been conducted in the past to attempt to 
achieve this; however, little research has involved real-time testing which could provide 
much more insight into this problem.  A better understanding of radiation effects can lead 
to better counter measures and error prevention techniques.  
1.2 Scope  
     Research in this thesis focuses on the continuation of previous studies in the field of 
radiation effects on electronics.  In particular, hard, stuck-at value faults and delay faults 
are targeted.  Stuck-at faults, when caused by radiation, are known as Single Event 
Upsets (SEUs) where a signal’s value is stuck high or low regardless of its driving logic.  
When radiation causes degraded performance over time, leading to timing issues, it is 
known as a Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effect.  The research preceding this effort involved 
the irradiation of a Virtex-4 Mini Module that reported to a Virtex II Pro Evaluation 
Board with flash memory.  In an attempt to simplify the system, this research 
incorporates Xilinx Virtex-4 FX 12 Evaluation Board reporting directly to a 
hyperterminal.   
1.3 Contributions  
     The goal of this research is to characterize the effects of different types of radiation on 
integrated circuits.  Three steps are necessary to achieve this goal.  First, models of the 
perceived effects of radiation must be developed.  Next, an architecture must be designed 
and implemented to the FPGA that will detect different types of radiation-induced faults, 
along with their location, amount, and duration.  Finally, this architecture must be 
implemented onto a FPGA and exposed to an environment simulating radiation exposure 
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while the fault data from the previous step is reported and analyzed.   Ideally, the results 
will lead to a suitable alternative to physically hardening circuits by using improved 
designs on FPGAs.    
     In order to gather relevant data to achieve these results, a fault detection and diagnosis 
algorithm is designed to identify two types of faults caused by radiation as they occur.  
Faults are detected with 14 networks of signals that are monitored by comparator and 
analyzer logic on the FPGA.  The signals model static memory and implemented logic 
that are designed to detect SEUs and TIDs, respectively.  Faults are detected when any of 
the signals is carrying an unexpected value.  This is easy to accomplish for static memory 
because the values of the signals never change under normal operating conditions.  
Detecting TID faults is more complicated as it requires a timing element that involves 
determining how far a generated input propagates through a network within one half of a 
clock cycle.  Additionally, bit values written to block memory are checked for bit-flips 
and reported.  The nature of these faults is somewhat unpredictable and can last as short 
as a couple of nanoseconds.  For this reason, the algorithm is designed to run at the 
maximum allowable frequency so it can detect and report as many faults as possible.   
     To provide even more information regarding radiation faults, the algorithm is 
designed to report the location, amount and duration of faults present on a FPGA.  The 
signals of the design are physically placed in separate sections of the FPGA.  Each of the 
sections contains its own set of signals and analyzers.  By keeping the networks 
separated, it can easily be determined which section is experiencing faulty signals based 
on the corresponding network that is reporting failures.  Meanwhile, the analyzer of each 
network adds up all the faulty signals within the network and a duration counter 
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increments every clock cycle in which a fault is present.  All of this information is 
recorded and reported to a hyperterminal in real-time. 
     This system can be interleaved with an operational circuit to catch faults before major 
errors occur. Another objective of the network is to determine if there are specific 
locations on the FPGA that are more vulnerable to radiation than others.  In addition to 
the real-time fault diagnostic algorithm, this research will provide more information 
regarding how radiation type, intensity, and length of exposure have different impacts on 
FPGAs.  Primarily, the differences between TID and SEU failures are investigated.  The 
contributions of this research an integral step for the creation of an effective, yet 
affordable radiation hardened design.   
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II. Background 
 
     This section describes some of the necessary background information needed to 
understand the fundamentals of fault testing, FPGAs, radiation and its effect on 
electronics.  Previous work in this field will also be covered in this chapter.  
2.1 FPGAs 
     Integrated circuits can be categorized into two main categories: Application Specific 
Integrated Circuits (ASICs) and FPGAs.  FPGAs are unique in that they have the ability 
to be reprogrammed an unlimited number of times as long as the device is functional.  
They consist of a field of transistors that form thousands of logic gates. The gates are 
mainly organized into configurable logic blocks (CLBs).  CLBs are made up of basic 
elements such as look-up tables (LUTs), multiplexors, and flip flops along with routing 
logic, pass transistors, and I/O pads.  Each CLB has the ability to carry out Boolean 
functions and can be linked together with routing blocks to form larger, more complex 
logic.  The CLBs are connected by a routing matrix that operates via arrays of routing 
switches [4].  When a design is written in a description language such as VHDL (Very 
high-speed integrated circuit Hardware Description Language), the FPGA is programmed 
by making the necessary routing connections between the proper CLBs to implement the 
design.  Furthermore, multiple designs can be routed on the FPGA as long as there is still 
room for them on the device. 
     Designs are implemented onto an FPGA with the use of development software.  In this 
research, Xilinx ISE Design Suite 12.4 is used.  This software assists in the process of 
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translating VHDL code to a routed map of CLBs that can be programmed to the FPGA.  
The software simplifies the process immensely with a relatively user-friendly interface.  
It even optimizes the VHDL code to make the routed design faster and more compact.  
However, optimization in this research is not necessarily a good thing, as discussed later 
in this section.  
     FPGAs have been in high demand because of their flexibility, high performance, low 
cost, and on-the-fly programming capability. These attributes have made FPGAs 
desirable for applications such as digital signal processing, software-defined radio, 
aerospace, and defense systems, ASIC prototyping, medical imaging, computer vision, 
speech recognition, cryptography, bioinformatics, computer hardware emulation, radio 
astronomy, metal detection and a growing range of other areas [5].  FPGAs have been 
used in space operations for over a decade; however, the radiation-filled environment has 
presented several problems that are still not fully understood.  The CLBs, memory 
elements and routing matrix are susceptible to ionization and physical damage from 
particles that are present in space.  This damage can actually alter the performance of 
FPGAs.  Developers are trying to overcome these problems by finding a way to 
implement fault deterring logic on FPGAs [6].  
2.2 Fault Detection and Diagnosis 
     Fault detection and diagnosis are an important part of digital circuit design.  A fault 
occurs when an unexpected output results from a given input.  The most common fault 
varieties are bridging faults, delay faults, and stuck-at faults.  The single stuck-at fault 
model is the most versatile model used for testing circuit logic thus far.  The model 
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presumes that a fault only affects the connection between gates, not the gates themselves. 
Therefore, a circuit will have twice as many fault possibilities as the number of 
connections between gates for the two stuck at values (one and zero).  Ideally, it would be 
possible to test for every single fault.  However, this becomes impractical considering the 
time it would take to test a large circuit with hundreds of inputs.  The list of faults can be 
reduced by eliminating equivalent faults by using methods such as fault equivalence and 
fault dominance [7].  
     After the reduced fault list is created, the goal is to create a test that will test for as 
many of these faults as possible with the fewest number of test input combinations (test 
vectors).  There may be some faults that are not detectable with any test vector.  These 
are referred to as redundant faults.  Achieving 100% fault efficiency means that all 
detectable faults are tested and the maximum fault coverage is attained.  Most input 
vectors will test for multiple faults, so utilizing every possible input combination is not 
necessary to achieve 100% fault efficiency.  By implementing an Automatic Test Pattern 
Generation (ATPG) program, a minimum number of test vectors will be produced that 
will achieve maximum fault efficiency.  Maximum efficiency will be achieved (not 
necessarily 100%) because the ATPG program will not test for faults that take too long to 
detect in larger circuits and it does not test for bridging or delay faults.  However, cycling 
through the ATPG produced set of test vectors and checking the outputs is the quickest 
way to detect a fault in a circuit.  
     Once a fault is detected, its location must be determined using a diagnostic approach.  
There are two ways to accomplish this: statically and dynamically.  The static method 
 8 
will continue cycling through the reduced vector list and analyzing the failed vectors 
along with the incorrect output.  This information is then sent to a large reference table to 
determine the fault location.  This method is easy to set up after the look-up table is 
made.  However, this takes a long time to accomplish because every test vector must be 
applied.  Dynamic testing is a much quicker method to diagnose a fault, but its algorithm 
is much more complicated.  Using this method, the program will determine the next test 
vector to run based on the previous output. 
2.3 Radiation Effects on Electronics 
     As stated before, space-bound systems are at great risk of failure due to radiation, and 
restoration of failed components can be a difficult task.  In space, circuitry is exposed to 
radiation consisting mainly of protons, electrons, and heavy ions.  Long periods of 
exposure to these energy particles can degrade performance of a device before eventually 
leading to failure.  This best describes TID failures, but radiation can also cause instant 
failure known as single-event effects (SEEs). 
     2.3.1 TID Effects. 
     The TID effect refers to the results of radiation accumulated in a device over a long 
period of time.  This long-term exposure causes the threshold voltage to shift to the point 
where the device characteristics change.  TID also causes increased leakage current and 
power consumption in addition to timing issues such as propagation delay and slower 
transition time.  A device’s insulation and conductive properties are also 
deteriorated as a result of TID.  All of these effects can occur at unpredictable lengths of 
exposure [8].  
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     Radiation damage in CMOS devices starts with electron-hole pairs created by the 
radiation source penetrating into the oxide layer of the device.  Many of these particles 
recombine with other atoms immediately, while the rest are left to drift towards an 
opposing field.  The leftover electrons naturally have a greater mobility than the holes, 
and are able to exit the oxide layer quickly.  Meanwhile, the remaining holes are left 
behind.  Under positive bias, the holes will slowly move toward the silicon layer in the 
same direction as the current.  However, hole traps created from imperfections in the 
device delay the holes on their way, making their travel unpredictable.  A larger number 
of trapped holes in the oxide layer change the overall charge if the oxide, altering the 
threshold voltage of the device.  Figure 1 shows the threshold voltage shift caused by TID 
for a 'p' and 'n' transistor.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Threshold Voltage of 'n' and 'p' Transistors During Irradiation [10] 
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Once the holes finally make it to the silicon layer, their absence in the oxide creates 
electron trap sites at the interface.  High temperatures or applied voltage will cause the 
trapped holes to gradually anneal and the performance of the device will eventually 
return to normal working condition [9].  A graph depicting the annealing characteristics 
with respect to time and temperature can be seen in Figure 2.  Since newer devices are 
becoming smaller and smaller, the transistors implemented in them are also becoming 
smaller along with the width of their oxide layers.   
 Thinner oxides will trap less total charge and the annealing time will be less overall.  
Therefore, newer technologies are inherently becoming more radiation resistant [11].  
However, TID will still cause problems in devices, regardless of size.  The most common 
source for TID testing is gamma radiation, which is present in space and can be caused 
Figure 2. Irradiation and Annealing Effects 
 with Respect to Time and Temperature [10] 
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by a nuclear blast.  For experimental purposes, gamma can be created with Co-60 which 
emits photons at 1.173 and 1.332 MeV energies.  Exposure to these, long range photons 
causes ionization uniformly over the entire device [10].  X-rays are also a popular source 
for TID testing, with energy ranges between 100 eV to 100 keV.  They have similar 
effects to FPGAs as gamma irradiation.  X-rays can be generated by bombarding tungsten 
with an electron beam.  Even electrons themselves can cause TID through ionization.  A 
van de Graaf can generate an electron beam with energies of 100 keV and 10 MeV [12].   
     2.3.2 Single Event Effects (SEEs). 
     Sub-atomic particles found in cosmic rays can penetrate into the FPGA and cause 
SEEs. When this happens, the high-energy particle leaves behind an ionized path of 
electron-hole pairs that can cause a temporary device failure as seen in Figure 3[8].   The 
Figure 3. Cosmic Ray Strike Through the Strain of a NMOS Transistor, Leaving 
Ionized Path of Electron-Hole Pairs [13] 
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amount of energy contained in the particle determines how much ionization is left in the 
device, about one electron-hole pair per 3.6 eV in silicon [12].  There are many types of 
SEEs including single-event latchup (SEL), single-event transients (SETs), single-event 
upsets (SEUs), and single-event functional interrupts (SEFIs).  SELs are the only 
destructive event out of the aforementioned, but they are all troublesome.  SEFIs, while 
not common, are cause for concern because they affect the device control to the point 
where the device needs to be reprogrammed.  They are also difficult to recognize during a 
test since the only evidence of one occurring is failed communication between testing 
equipment and the device or the test fixture crashing altogether [12].  This research 
focuses mainly on SEUs.  
     Sources that cause SEUs include protons, alphas, heavy ions and neutrons.  Protons 
are the most tested as they are the prime cause of SEEs in the belts of ionizing particles 
trapped by the Earth’s magnetic field [10].  The energy levels of these protons are 
typically greater than 15 MeV and can be reproduced from a cyclotron.  Alpha particles 
represent about 14% of cosmic ray particles and have a similar effect to that of protons.  
Alphas used in experimentation are generated by the decay of the nuclei of large, 
radioactive elements.  When produced by decay, they generally have much lower 
energies between three and seven MeV.  In space, however, they have much higher 
energies. 
     Heavy ions reside in cosmic ray outside of the Earth’s magnetic field with energies of 
10 to 1000 MeV [10].  They have less range in silicon than protons and alphas due to 
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Table 1. Table of Ions Commonly Used for SEU Testing [12] 
Ion 
Energy 
(MeV) 
Energy per Nucleon 
(MeV A-1
LET 
) (MeV mg-1 cm2 Range in Si ) 
7 44 Li 6.3 0.45 253 
11 50 B 4.5 1.6 91 
12 70 C 5.8 1.9 105 
14 69 N 4.9 2.8 73 
16 100 O 6.25 3.05 95 
19 100 F 5.3 4.3 73 
24 125 Mg 5.2 6.8 61 
28 137 Si 4.9 8.9 53 
32 160 S 5.0 10.8 53 
35 145 B 4.1 12.8 43 
40 160 Ca 4.0 16.3 39 
58 132 Ni 2.3 28.7 24 
127 100 I 0.8 47.5 15.5 
197 127.5 Au 0.65 59.3 1 
  
larger atomic masses but can have higher Linear Energy Transfer (LET) values to cause 
SEUs.  LET is the amount of energy deposited by a particle per unit of track length.  In 
order to cause a SEU, ions must not only reach the transistors, but must also have a high 
enough LET.   The range required to cause an upset is about 10 to 45 MeV mg-1cm2.  
Table 1 shows a list of ions commonly used for radiation testing [12].  Secondary 
neutrons released from heavy ions have been known to cause SEUs as well.  In an 
experimental setting, a fluence of 1015 neutrons per cm2 is needed to induce an SEU. 
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     SEUs have a functional effect on FPGAs that result in functional and memory bit flips 
('0' to '1' or vice versa).  SEUs can be categorized as single-bit upsets (SBUs) or multiple-
bit upsets (MBUs).  A SBU is classified as a fault that occurs in one place. The FPGA is 
geometrically divided into columns and rows that map out the individual components on 
the chip as seen in Figure 4 for the Virtex II.  SBUs occur in a single cell from this 
mapping while MBUs occur in tow or more adjacent cells as seen in Figure 5.  
Unfortunately, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two since some MBUs can 
have the same affect on a FPGA as a SBU.  
2.4 Previous Work 
This field of study has become increasingly popular over the past few years.  
Organizations such as Los Alamos National Labs [14], AFIT [3], MDA(Ontario) [15], 
Figure 4. Physical Layout of the Virtex-II [14] 
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NASA [16], and Italy [17]  have recently produced relevant papers in the area of 
radiation faults in FPGAs.  
2.4.1 Los Alamos National Laboratory Efforts.  
     Some of the most complete analysis of radiation effects on FPGAs has come from the 
national labs in Los Alamos.  Using proton and heavy ion radiation, they have surveyed 
SEUs on several boards from the Vitrex family.  They recorded SBUs and MBUs on 
various FPGA components exposed to an array of radiation intensities.  Table 2 shows 
the amount SBU and MBUs on each of the boards tested.  The increase in MBUs with the 
newer boards can be attributed to the smaller, compact technology on the newer devices.  
Another interesting trend is shown in Figures 6 and 7 where BRAM errors become more 
prevalent with increased radiation on the Virtex 4, while the converse is true on the 
Virtex 5. 
  
     (a)                                    (b)                  
Figure 5. (a) Upset Adjacency Neighborhood (b) MBU of Three Upset Bits [14] 
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Table 2. Frequency of Upset Events and Percent of Total Events Induced by 
Proton Radiation (65 MeV) for Five Xilinx FPGAs 
Family Total Events 1-Bit Events 2-Bit Events 3-Bit Events 4-Bit 
Events 
Virtex 241,166 241,070 
(99.96%) 
96 (0.04%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Virtex-II 541,823 523,280 
(98.42%) 
6,293 
(1.16%) 
56 (0.01%) 3 (0.001%) 
Virtex-II 
Pro 
10,430 10,292 
(98.68%) 
136 (1.30%) 2 (0.02%) 0 (0%) 
Virtex-4 152,577 147,902 
(96.44%) 
4,567 
(2.99%) 
78 (0.05%) 8 (0.005%) 
Virtex-5  
(65 MeV) 
2,963 2,792 
(94.23%) 
161 (5.43%) 9 (0.30%) 1 (0.03%) 
Virtec-5 
(200 MeV) 
35,324 31,741 
(89.86%) 
3.105 
(8.79%) 
325 (0.92%) 110 
(0.43%) 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Events by Resource on a Virtex-4  
Irradiated with Heavy Ions 
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     This information is very informative and groundbreaking as there are still many 
unknowns regarding FPGAs under radiation.  However, there is still some analysis that is  
yet to be performed.  There were not many details regarding how the upsets were 
detected (probably due to proprietary information), but it is known that the samples were 
evaluated after radiation.  Additionally, there is no information on any trends regarding 
location of the upsets.  For this reason, AFIT has been working on an effort to detect 
radiation- induced faults as they occur and to characterize any trends in their location on 
the FPGA to someday be able to prevent these faults.   
      2.4.2 AFIT Efforts. 
     The research presented in this thesis is a continuation of research accomplished by 
past students.  Most recently, a successful test setup was built that implemented a 15 foot 
Figure 7. Distribution of Events by Resource on a Virtex-5  
Irradiated with Heavy Ions 
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cable connecting a Virtex-4 being irradiated to a Virtex-II Pro performing the fault 
diagnosis.  The cable was customized for the long, aluminum tube in the gamma reactor 
at the Ohio State Nuclear facility.  This setup also included two feet of wire that 
separated the FPGA on a mini-module from a baseboard, so the baseboard would not get 
irradiated along with the mini module.  This setup was physically superior to any setup 
created in the past.  However, the algorithm implemented in fault detection and diagnosis 
was too slow to catch many intermittent faults.  The program performing the test was 
running at 1 MHz while the Virtex II has the ability to run at 100 MHz [3].  The design 
was also optimized with Xilinx ISE software, meaning it was collapsed down into a 
structure different and smaller than intended.  Therefore, even if the algorithm did detect 
any faults, there was a good chance that the detected fault would not be in the location 
reported.  
     Additionally, the most recent test detection algorithm ran through all possible 
combinations of test vectors instead of a minimized vector set with the same fault  
coverage.  This created an extra 488 test vectors that had to be tested based on a nine-
input design.  Therefore, the chances of an intermittent fault slipping going undetected 
increased dramatically.  The latest research also focused on a fault recovery technique 
known as triple-design triple-modular redundancy (TDTMR).  This method used three 
different styles of adders with the same inputs.  The outputs were compared with a voter 
creating a single point of failure.  As it turned out, the only faults that were successfully 
located were at the voter [3].     
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Table 3. Virtex-5 CLBs and FFs Fluence to Upset [15] 
Fluence to 
Upset (p/cm2
Number of 
Errors ) 
 
Upset Signature Number of Bit 
Flops 
Recovery 
Method 
4.3E9 1 
LED 2 Partially 
On 
1029 Re-program FPGA 
9.1E9 1 LED 6 On 1177 Re-program FPGA 
6.4E9 1 LED 7 On 1542 Re-program FPGA 
8.2E9 1 LED 2 Partially 
On 
303 Re-program FPGA 
1.1E9 1 LED 2 On 701 Re-program FPGA 
1.2E9 1 LED 3 On 280 Re-program FPGA 
1.7E9 1 LED 3 On 1135 Re-program FPGA 
1.7E9 1 LED 4 On 133 Re-program FPGA 
2.0E9 1 LED 5 On 580 Re-program FPGA 
2.2E9 1 LED 2 On 486 Re-program FPGA 
    
     2.4.3 Recent Detection Methodologies. 
  A couple of SRAM-based SEU detection methods have been constructed involving 
functional blocks and memory cells. In [15], multiple sets of counters, multipliers and 
Block Random Access Memory (BRAM) are implemented onto a Virtex 5 FPGA.  If the 
outputs within any set of these elements do not agree with each other, a LED lights up, 
indicating a SEU.  This allowed somewhat of a real-time detection method, but the in- 
depth results had to be retrieved after the experiments.  The FPGA was irradiated with 
 20 
Table 4. Virtex-5 BRAM Fluences to Upset [15] 
Fluence to 
Upset (p/cm2
Number of 
Errors ) Upset Signature Recovery Method 
1.85E9 2 Single Bit Flip in Separate BRAM Blocks Re-program FPGA 
2.56E9 1 Single Bit Flip Re-program FPGA 
6.19E9 1 Single Bit Flip Re-program FPGA 
 
various fluences of proton radiation and faults were detected with each method.  Each 
fault was recoverable by FPGA reconfiguration.  The results are shown in Tables 3 and 4.  
These are some of the most useful SEU data to date.     
     2.4.4 Fault Mitigation Strategies. 
     As noted in the research from [15], reprogramming the FPGA resolved the SEU 
issues.  Studies in [16] focus on providing geographically separate areas of the FPGA in 
which applications experiencing faults may automatically relocate to a fault-free area of 
the device.  A series of latches was used as the logic and statistical injected faults were 
inserted to analyze the effectiveness of the reconfiguration execution.  Efforts in [17] also 
implement an automatic reconfiguration algorithm.  This methodology goes one step 
further in keeping track of which areas of the FPGA are repeatedly getting faults.  They 
claim that this distinguishes between SEUs and TIDs because they state that TIDs are not 
recoverable.  However, many articles, including [18] suggest otherwise.  Nonetheless, 
this study is at the cutting edge as it provides a smarter reconfiguration algorithm and has 
been tested with real radiation.  
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III. Methodology 
 
     The goal of this research is to combine some of the previous efforts by characterizing 
the effects of different types of radiation on integrated circuits in greater detail and in 
real-time.  In order to achieve this, models of the perceived effects of radiation must be 
developed; an architecture must be designed and implemented to the FPGA that will 
detect different types of radiation-induced faults, along with their location, amount, and 
duration; and this architecture, implemented on a FPGA; and it must be exposed to a 
radiation-like environment while the fault data is reported and analyzed.    
3.1 Radiation Effects on FPGA Applications 
     The fault detection system in this research is designed to detect SEU and TID faults, 
modeled as stuck-at faults and delay faults respectively.  Although radiation causes other 
types of faults, these are the two that are the most predominant and easiest to model. 
     3.1.1 SEU Effects. 
     The proposed fault model suggests that stuck-at faults can occur in memory cells and 
along any signal on the FPGA's routed logic.  The stuck-at fault model is based on the 
assumption that SEU faults consist of routing logic that is stuck-at a value of either ‘1’ or 
‘0’.  These values commonly represent an open or short circuit.  However, in terms of 
radiation damage, they more accurately indicate a localized ionization that causes a 
CMOS device to temporarily make a connection to ground or the power supply, 
depending on the transistor affected.  When a SEU is present in an FPGA application, the 
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result or output may be incorrect depending on the input.  A fault must be activated and 
propagated through an application for a bad output to be detectable [7].   
     The ability to expose all possible faults requires a combination of inputs that will 
activate and propagate each fault.  One specific fault can be detected by analyzing the 
combination of inputs, with the corresponding incorrect outputs.  Multiple faults are more 
difficult to locate since their effects on the output can alter the effect on the output.  
Specific combinations of faults present may be impossible to detect depending on the size 
and complexity of the application.  Not only do SEUs impact logic applications, they can 
also affect memory.  Memory faults may or may not be difficult to detect, depending on 
the severity of the glitch they inflict on the output.  In order to properly characterize the 
effect of an SEU on an FPGA, the number of faults must be tabulated along with their 
location and duration for various types of radiation.   
     3.1.2 TID Effects. 
     TIDs are most commonly witnessed as delay faults.  Delay faults are observed when 
all of the input data do not quite make it through a series of logic gates  before the output 
is recorded.  This causes a faulty output that can be difficult to properly diagnose, 
especially if SEUs and TIDs are being tested for simultaneously.  A separate delay test 
must be implemented to track a signal that traverses through all of the logic blocks.  The 
delay-causing effects of a TID can mimic those of heat-induced slowdown.  Therefore, in 
order to single out a TID, slowdown must occur over a long period of time under 
radiation without being exposed to extraneous heat.  In order to properly characterize the 
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effect of a TID fault on a FPGA, the slowdown of the device, the location of the affected 
area, the duration, and the temperature must be noted.  
3.2 Active Sensor Network 
     In order to effectively and efficiently detect, categorize, and characterize faults on a 
FPGA, a specialized system is constructed instead of developing input/output analysis 
fault detection to a functional circuit design.  Traditionally, a functional design such as an 
adder is implemented with a fault detection algorithm based on inputs that generate faulty 
outputs.  However, this method usually requires analysis of a large number of input 
vectors depending on the size of the design.  In this research, a relatively large circuit 
design is created with only three inputs and 25 outputs that requires only two input 
vectors to detect and diagnose all possible faults.   The active sensor network is a 
standalone system with a specialized structure and algorithm designed to collect and 
report any fault data.  It is designed to run continuously and provide the aforementioned 
characterization information when any faults are detected.   
    3.2.1 Structure. 
     The network consists of a series of three-input/output inverter blocks, or sensors, 
while three signals traverse a section of the FPGA, from sensor to sensor.  The three 
signals are used to detect the different types of faults.  Two of the signals are 
complementary and static, designed to expose SEUs stuck at one and zero.  The third 
signal alternates between one and zero every clock cycle and is designed to measure 
delay by observing how far the signal gets through the network when the critical value is 
recorded.  The signals originate as a three-bit input vector which is generated and sent to 
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the first sensor.  From there, the vector traverses a section of the FPGA, from sensor to 
sensor.  Each bit of the vector is inverted when it passes through a sensor (i.e. vector 
“100” becomes “011” after it passes through a sensor).  The output vector of each sensor 
not only feeds to the next sensor, but is also sent to an analyzer to determine if it has the 
correct value.    
     15 sensor networks are placed over the entire area of the FPGA, each with 29 sensors.  
Ease of reporting, operating frequency, switching characteristics, and resource 
availability are factors in determining these amounts,   Four of these sensors act as delay 
Figure 8. Active Sensor Network Layout on the FPGA 
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buffers whose outputs are not monitored.  This will be discussed further in the next 
section.  The sensors are geographically grouped by network onto distinct areas of the 
FPGA with ISE Planahead software.  The sensors are spaced as evenly as possible within 
the constraints of the FPGA.  Figure 8 shows how the FPGA is divided into the 15 
networks in Planahead.   
     Figure 9 illustrates how the sensors are spread across each network.  The red lines 
represent a high signal, the blue lines represent a low signal, the purple lines represent a 
signal that alternates between high to low.  The black lines represent three, 25-bit vectors 
comprised of the results of each sensor output that are sent to the analyzer.  The sensor 
layout in Figure 9 is simplified for clarity.   The actual signal path traverses back and 
Figure 9. Active Sensor Network Configuration 
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forth across the FPGA to increase coverage while maintaining an approximate distance 
between each sensor.  More details on the sensor layout are presented in the next section. 
     3.2.2 Algorithm.  
     The fault detection and characterization algorithm is developed structurally in VHDL.  
The two main components are the analyzer and reporter.  The analyzers for each network 
detect fault information for their respective networks, while the reporter compiles the 
information from every network into one fault code for the entire FPGA. 
          3.2.2.1 Network Fault Analyzer. 
     Instead of monitoring inputs and outputs of an entire logic system, the outputs of each 
sensor are fed into an analyzer that monitors their validity.  The analyzer detects any 
discrepancies between the expected outputs and the actual outputs of the sensors.  An 
initial snapshot of all the sensor outputs is examined at first to determine which of the 
three signal paths (if any) are incorrect.  A faulty static signal indicates the presence of a 
SEU.  If the static signals are correct but the alternating signal is faulty, a TID or delay 
fault is present.  SEUs are sought after first because they will also compromise the TID 
detection.  Therefore, if a SEU is present, TIDs will not be tested for within a network so 
no false TIDs will be reported.  Once the type of fault is determined, a two-bit error 
designator is generated and sent to the reporter. 
     It is simple to detect errors from the static signals because the outputs never change 
under normal operating conditions.  The analyzer is designed to compare sensor outputs 
to expected values every time there is a change in the outputs in addition to every rising 
edge of the clock signal.  Therefore, the analyzer should be able to detect SEU faults that 
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last only a matter of nanoseconds depending on the switching speed of the sensor.  Once 
a fault is detected, the outputs of all the sensors are examined to determine how many 
faults are present.  Since one bad sensor output can alter the expected values of the 
remaining sensors in the chain, the analyzer compares the output of each sensor to the 
output of the preceding sensor.  This way, a faulty sensor at the beginning of the chain 
will be reported as one failing sensor instead of several.   
     Once a SEU is detected from a sensor, that sensor is labeled faulty until a reset signal 
is received from the reporter.  The number of faulty sensors is added up into one value to 
send to the reporter.  Additionally, the analyzer keeps a tally of clock cycles in which a 
fault is present in the network.  This value is incremented when a faulty value is passed to 
the analyzer and the clock signal switches from low to high.  The tally keeps track of the 
duration of existing faults in the network and is also only reset when the reset signal is 
received from the reporter.  When a SEU is detected, the network analyzer sends the fault 
count and duration count to the reporter.   
      TIDs and delay detection is more involved since the dynamic signal changes every 
clock cycle.  There is an inherent delay from sensor to sensor that must be accounted for.  
This delay is attributed to the time it takes for the signal to get processed by the inverter 
and the time it takes the signal to get passed to the next inverter.  Figure 9 illustrates the 
timing relationships between the outputs of the sensors in which the delay can be seen.  
Unlike SEU detection, the analyzer is programmed to capture the sensor output values on 
the falling edge of the clock.  This gives the signal a half clock cycle to reach the end of 
the sensor network.  A clock period of 40 nanoseconds is selected after several dozen 
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simulations involving adjustments of clock speed, number of sensors, and distance 
between sensors.  If the signal does not pass through the last sensor within 20 
nanoseconds, a TID error is reported.   
     Ideally, under normal operating conditions (radiation-free at room temperature) the 
signal will reach the end of the network with very little slack left until the falling edge.  
This way, smaller amounts of heat or TID-induced delay will be reported.  Figure 10 
shows how this delay accumulates from sensor to sensor, up to the falling edge of the 
clock.  Not all of the networks posses the same amount of inherent delay.  This is because 
not all networks have the same shape, so the sensors could not be placed in the exact 
same orientation in each network.  Hence, some network paths have shorter distances 
between sensors than others.  Therefore, the analyzer is catered to the network with the 
most inherent delay.  The rest of the networks have slightly more slack since all the 
Figure 10. Sensor Output Signal Timing Relationships and Delay Accumulation 
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networks are driven by the same clock.  
     To properly detect faults in the alternating signal, a simple counter (incrementing 
every clock cycle) is devised.  The analyzer uses the Least Significant Bit (LSB) of the 
counter to determine if the sensor outputs of the alternating signal are correct.  For 
example, when the LSB of the counter is zero, the value of the alternating signal from 
Sensor 0 should be zero; Sensor 1’s output should be one, and so on.  When the LSB of 
the counter is one, the opposite values are expected (Sensor 0 outputs a one, Sensor 1 
outputs a one, and so on).  If a faulty output is discovered, the corresponding error code is 
sent to the reporter followed by the comparison of individual sensor outputs, similar to 
the SEU detection.  The analyzer compares the outputs of consecutive sensors, starting at 
the end of the chain to make sure their values are different.   
     The first two consecutive sensor outputs from the end of the chain with the same value 
is the furthest point that the signal gets when the clock signal falls.  The percent 
slowdown can be calculated from this point.  It is expected that the first delay will be 
detected by the last sensor in the chain.  In this situation, the percent slowdown is 
estimated to be 3.4 percent since there are 29 sensors (1/29).  This equates to a delay of 
about 690 picoseconds (3.4% of 20 ns).  As the delay gets worse, sensors earlier in the 
chain will begin to detect the fault.  The position of the detecting sensors is sent to the 
reporter.  Similarly to SEU detection, a duration counter is tabulated while delay is 
present and sent to the reporter.     
           
 
 30 
          3.2.2.2 System Fault Reporter. 
     The purpose of the reporter is to organize all the fault data and present it in a timely, 
easily comprehensive manor.  The reporter is limited by the amount of information that 
can be sent to the hyperterminal at a time.  An RS232 serial cable connects the FPGA 
board to a COM port of a laptop.  For this application the hyperterminal can transfer data 
at a maximum baud rate of 230 kilobits per second.  Owing to this constraint, the reporter 
is designed to output one 32-bit fault code at a time.  The reporter gathers the fault data 
from all of the network analyzers and compiles 32-bit fault codes for each of them.  If no 
faults are present in a network, the code is all zeros. 
     The fault code describes the network containing faults, the type of fault detected, the 
number of errors within that network, and the number of clock cycles the error has been 
present since the last report.  In the event of a TID or delay fault, the output will indicate 
how far the signal got to the end of the network before a result is recorded instead of the 
total number of faults in the network.  The 32-bit code is converted to eight hexadecimal 
characters when it is sent to the hyperterminal for easier interpretation.  The first 
character is the network designator from ‘0’ to ‘E’.  The second character describes the 
type of fault present.  An ‘E’ or ‘F’ indicates a SEU while ‘C’ or ‘D’ indicates a 
TID/delay.  The last bit of the error designator carries over into the value of the following 
character, representing the number of faults or amount of delay since five bits are needed 
to cover the range of 1 - 25.  
     The last five characters are reserved for the fault duration, providing a maximum of 
1,048,576 clock cycles (42 milliseconds).  Such a long period of time is needed because 
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any given network may have to wait for the rest of the networks to report its data, 
including transfer time, before the fault code can be read.  This ensures that a greater 
percentage of faults are accounted for.  This is important because one limitation of the 
algorithm is the inability for the reporter to log fault data for a network while that 
network’s data is being sent to the hyper-terminal.  During this process, a network’s fault 
code ceases to update so a steady value may be sent off.  Unfortunately, this means 
approximately 6.3% of the time, faults may go undetected.  Once a network’s fault data 
has been successfully sent to hyper-terminal, the reporter sends a reset signal to that 
network so all the error flags, fault counts and durations are set back to zero for the 
process to repeat.  An example of a SEU fault (three SEUs in Network 5 lasting for 32 
clock cycles) report output is shown in Figure 11a and a TID example (3.4% slowdown 
in Network A lasting for four clock cycles) in Figure 11b.  
     The power PC controls which networks get reported and when.  It pulls data from 
each network one at a time, sequentially, as fast as possible.  Data is pulled from Network 
0 first, followed by Network 1, and so on up to Network E.  After that, the reporter sends 
the value of the counter signal if any errors are present on the FPGA at the time before 
  
             (a)                              (b) 
Figure 11. (a) Sample Report Format for a SEU (b) For a TID 
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the process repeats.  The counter serves as a timestamp to indicate when the faults occur.  
The value of the counter will always be sent every five minutes as a time-check and 
operational check.  Every 15 minutes, the counter resets itself to keep the bit size of the 
counter down while continuing to provide time-checks. 
3.3 Block Memory Bit-Flip Detection 
     As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the SEU detection portion of the sensor 
network is designed to simulate memory bits.  The total design in this research also tests 
for bit flips in actual Block Random Access Memory (BRAM).  At the beginning of the 
program, the Power PC writes eight kilobytes of data to BRAM in an alternating 
“01010...” pattern.  The purpose of the alternating pattern is to check for stuck-at-one and 
stuck-at-zero faults evenly.  During fault detection, these values are read 32 bits at a time.  
If the value read from BRAM is not the original alternating pattern, its value is printed 
out to hyper-terminal with an “Invalid BRAM” statement.  Descriptive fault data is not 
included with the error statement for two reasons: it is unknown which area of the FPGA 
specific bits are written to and there is no clock associated with the BRAM so the 
duration is not known.   
3.4 Test Setup 
     The Xilinx Virtex 4 FX 12 Evaluation Kit is used as the device under test (DUT) for 
this research.  Figure 12 shows the board with the FPGA in the center, power and JTAG 
connections on the top and serial port on the left.  This board was chosen for this research 
for its ease of use and good value.  For many of the experiments, the metal heat spreader 
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lid is removed from the FPGA to observe more faults.  The experiments discussed in this 
section are the injected fault test, a series of thermal tests, and optical flash test.     
     3.4.1 Injected Fault Test.     
     Before field testing, the system must validated by simulating faults to avoid damaging 
boards without useful results.  In order to do this, the design code includes three fault 
injection sites in each network.  When activated, these faults are automatically injected at 
the 200 ns point.  This method serves as an initial check to make sure the system is 
operating correctly.  An injected fault consists of a hardwired ‘1’ or ‘0’ into a sensor 
instead of the output from the previous sensor.  A variety of fault combinations (SEU and 
TID) are injected in each network to make sure each network is catching every fault.  
Figure 12. DUT, Virtex-4 Evaluation Kit [19] 
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     3.4.2 Thermal Testing. 
     A convenient, low-cost method of testing is executed by subjecting the DUT to a 
number of high temperature tests.  The temperature increase is proven to cause delay by 
shifting the threshold voltage and increasing leakage current [20], similarly to TID 
effects. The thermal tests conducted in this research are the temperature chamber test, 
heat gun test, optical laser test, and soldering iron test. 
          3.4.2.1 Temperature Chamber. 
     The first test features the use of a heat chamber that subjects the FPGA to high 
temperatures (up to 110 0 C).  A Watlow temperature chamber is used for this experiment.  
This chamber has a temperature range of -700C to 1800C with variable rates of change.    
The DUT is placed inside the chamber connected to a RS232 serial cable, FPGA 
programmer, and power from an Agilent triple output DC power supply.  These 
connection cables are fed through an insulated hole in the side of the chamber.   The DUT 
is cooled down to -100C before it heats up to 1100
          3.4.2.2 Heat Gun Test. 
C and finally cools back down to room 
temperature. Fault data is recorded throughout the experiment.  
     This test is applied to analyze the effect of instantaneous, high-temperature presence 
on the outer portion of the FPGA.  This is designed to be a destructive test, heating the 
DUT until it fails while collecting data.  A heat gun is set to 6490
           
C and is aimed at the 
DUT from one inch away for this test. 
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          3.4.2.3 Optical Laser Test. 
     The optical laser test is conducted based on research from [21] in which flash memory 
bits are erased by focusing a 50 mW laser on a group of memory cells for several 
minutes.  In this experiment, the same procedure from [3] is followed with a couple of 
exceptions.  Since no faults were detected in [3], only 50 mW lasers are used.  The 
pinhole is also left out in this experiment, as the diameter of the laser beam is much 
smaller than the area of one of the sensor networks implemented on the FPGA.  The first 
iteration of the test focuses the laser on the upper left corner (Network 0) of the de-lidded 
FPGA from 12 inches away in an attempt to induce and record a fault in that region.  
Further iterations include the use of up to three lasers focused on the some corner of the 
DUT from as close as three inches away.    
          3.4.2.3 Soldering Iron Test. 
     The soldering iron test is a more intense method of infusing a localized heating 
element.  In this test, a 3160
     3.4.3 Optical Flash Test. 
C soldering iron is applied to a corner of the FPGA while 
fault data is monitored.  Each of the four corners are tested to verify if the system reports 
the correct region affected by the heat.          
     The optical flash test is also setup following the procedures from [3] in an attempt to 
record bit flips caused by Electrical Magnetic Interference (EMI).  Both an unmodified 
and a de-lidded FPGA are exposed to a flashes ranging from 18.75 W to 600 W from 
distances ranging from three to nine inches away. 
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3.5 Impact 
     This research provides insight of how different types of radiation can affect a FPGA 
device.  Ideally, some clues can be revealed on ways to prevent radiation-induced with 
FPGA design techniques.  For example, there may be an area of the device that is less 
prone to faults.  This fault detection system could also be interleaved with a primary 
application that may detect faults before they start impacting the main system.  Possibly 
the most valuable prevention method of this research is the slowdown notification.  If the 
system is reporting a 12% slowdown, the operator can decrease the clock-speed by 12% 
to adjust for the slower performance before larger errors occur in the main system.  
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IV. Results and Analysis 
 
     Many interesting design properties of the Xilinx Virtex-4 are revealed during the 
making of the fault characterization system.  They are presented in this chapter along 
with the results and analysis of the fault injection, thermal, optical, and EM experiments.   
4.1 Design 
     The placement and routing of the system produces some interesting results that affect 
the rest of the experiments.  The two main concerns of these findings affect the physical 
layout of the design and the timing of the design.   
     4.1.1 Layout. 
     Although the hardware is established structurally in VHDL with the “keep” attribute 
to prevent optimization, the actual implemented design is substantially different.  The 
biggest difference between the perceived structure and the implemented design is the 
basic sensor component.  The portion of the sensor that inverts the alternating TID 
detection signal is clearly represented by a LUT in Planahead.  However, the portion of 
the sensor that inverts the static SEU detection signal is not assigned to any type of 
device whatsoever on the FPGA map.  In fact, only sensors nine through 24 list this 
inverting component in the selectable architecture.  They can be confined to a region on 
the FPGA but ca not be assigned to a specific device like the alternating signal inverters.  
The absence of the static signal inverters in sensors zero through eight may suggest that 
they were optimized.  This should not be the case, however, since all of the sensors were 
coded the same way. 
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     4.1.2 Timing.  
     Timing is another factor that must be accounted for after placement and routing.  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, several trials are run to determine how many sensors 
to implement in each network and the proper frequency for the system.  During these 
trials, a timing profile is produced to more effectively relate the delay fault readout to the 
actual slowdown of a network by finding the average slack between the switching of the 
last sensor in the chain to the falling edge of the clock signal.  Although Xilinx provides 
some switching characteristics in [22], the switching time of the LUTs being used is not 
provided.  Additionally, the time required for the signal to travel between sensors is 
unknown.  Therefore, the amount of added delay caused by one sensor and the trace 
length associated with it need to be calculated.  This is accomplished by fixing 35 sensors 
to specific locations in every network, logging the delay readout, and removing two 
sensors at a time until no errors are reported.  The extra, non-reporting sensors are placed, 
in pairs, between Sensors 0 and 1 and between Sensors 1 and 2 the basic detection logic 
does not require changing.   
     The distance between sensors is made as constant as possible within the confines of 
logic that is already placed.  A general sensor path for a network is illustrated in Figure 
13.   The red dots are the sensors fixed to a location with their sensor number beside them 
in red.  The blue dots are unfixed, non-sensor logic blocks.  The signal travels from 
Sensor 0 to Sensor 24.  The first four reporting sensors have two sensors between each of 
them labeled with an ‘a’ or ‘b’ suffix.  The extra sensors basically require the signal to 
travel all the way to the next block and back before it can proceed, hypothetically tripling 
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the amount of time required for the signal to pass through one main sensor and get to the 
next main sensor.  This methodology is based on the assumption that the switching time 
and distance are the only two factors affecting the time it takes to pass from one sensor to 
another.   
     While performing the analysis, it is noted that the removal of sensors produces a wide 
range of results from network to network and trial to trial.  Some networks show a 
reported delay decrease of three, while other networks actually report a greater delay 
when two sensors are removed.  This inconsistency is likely due to the rerouting that 
takes place when the number of sensors is altered.  Each time the design is implemented, 
only the fixed sensors retain their position.  The logic that makes up the rest of the system 
(i.e. the analyzers and reporter) is routed differently each time.  While this would not 
seem to make much of a difference, clearly it does have an impact on the behavior on the 
Figure 13. Fixed Sensor Layout for Delay Characterization with Labeled Sensors 
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results produced by the system.  Fixing all of the logic components of the system may 
produce more consistent results, but would also involve individually placing thousands of 
CLBs.   
     The measured result from these trials is the average decrease in reported delay value 
per sensor removed.   The expected value of this figure is one since one less sensor 
should allow the signal to reach one more sensor along the chain before the clock signal 
falls.  The actual figure is less than one however.  With a sample size of 33 delay values, 
a standard deviation of 0.33, and a variance of 0.11, the average decrease in delay value 
per sensor removed is 0.77.  This, along with the wide range of results between trials 
proves the assumption previously stated is incorrect and that there are many more 
variables affecting the delay than just sensor switching speed and separation distance.  To 
add to the uncertainty of this problem, not every network reported data for each of the 
trials.  This is very noticeable in the trials with the maximum amount of extra sensors.  
This anomaly will be discussed further in the fault injection results section. 
     Despite the varying results of the delay trials, a baseline can still be established to 
quantify delay based on the reported value given by the algorithm.  Equations (1) and (2) 
are used to calculate sensor delay (SD) and slack (SL) where HCP represents a half clock 
period (20 ns) and S is the number of sensors.  These equations are based on the 
assumption that every sensor takes an equal amount of time to receive a signal and pass it 
to the next sensor.  No delay is reported from the system with 29 sensors.  Applying S29 
to Equation (1) gives a SDMAX of 0.69 ns.  However, the 31-sensor system yields delay 
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values of one in the majority of the networks.  Owing to this, the SDMIN is 0.65 ns.  
Applying SDMIN and S29 to Equation (2) produces a SLMAX
SD = HCP/S                                          (1)            
 of 1.15 ns. 
SL = HCP – SD * S                                           (2)            
     From this point, an average decrease in reported delay of one is needed to make the 
system error free, while utilizing the entire 20 ns for the signal to reach the final sensor.  
However, two sensors must be removed, decreasing the reported delay value by 1.54 
according to the data collected earlier (1.54 = 0.77 * 2).  Therefore, a system with zero 
slack should have an equivalent of 29.7 sensors (31 minus 1/0.7 sensors).  Applying these 
new values to Equation (1) yields a SDAVG of 0.67 ns.  This average fits exactly in the 
middle of the previously calculated range.  The resulting SLAVG
PS = (20 – (0.67 * DV + 0.57))/20                            (3)           
 on a 29-sensor network 
from Equation (2) is 0.57 ns.  Therefore, Percent Slowdown can be calculated ± 3% with 
Equation (3) with DV being the reported delay value. 
4.2 Injected Fault Test 
     The injected fault tests are a good baseline to check for proper system functionality.  
However, not all faults can be simulated due to limitations of the Power PC synthesis.  
These limitations along with the results of the injected fault test are discussed in this 
section. 
     4.2.1 Injected Fault Limitations. 
     The fault injection component of the system is designed to hard-code high or low 
signals into three areas of each network to emulate SEUs.  Various lengths of fault 
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presence are tested.  However, the injected faults are driven by the counter so they can be 
injected when the counter value changes.  Since the counter changes every 40 ns, the 
shortest fault length testable is also 40 ns.  Additionally, the Power PC does not recognize 
“wait” statements, which happen to be the basis of the injected delay fault.  A sensor is 
designed to pass its value to the next sensor 10 ns after receiving an input when a delay 
fault is injected.  Since the Power PC cannot relate the clock frequency to a specified 
period of time in the hardware, delay faults cannot be modeled.     
     4.2.2 Analysis. 
     The system is successfully able to detect injected stuck-at faults of various durations 
down to the shortest of 40 ns.  The expected fault numbers and durations are also 
recorded.  For faults lasting longer than one reporting cycle, a lapse of duration coverage 
is observed.  For example, Figure 14 shows a report of 14 faults injected to each of the 14 
networks for 65,536 clock cycles (2.6 ms), all stating at the same time.  Network 2 is the 
first to report the fault, 78 clock cycles after it is injected.  The next time Network 2 
reports, the duration is 43,251 clock cycles equating to 22,207 clock cycles where the 
fault is present but its duration is unaccounted for.  Therefore, the timing and location of 
the fault can affect the reported duration (Networks 8 – E in this example record the 
entire fault duration).  One aspect of the fault injection test is unexplainable, however, as 
most test runs have one or two networks do not report their faults.  This anomaly is not 
explainable at this time as every fault is designed exactly the same and there is no 
recognizable pattern of which network will not report.    
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4.3 Temperature Chamber Test Results 
     Three attempts of the thermal test are conducted.  The first two produce results that 
are not very valuable.  The thermal chamber is heated up to the rated temperature of the 
FPGA at 900C where data collection was ceased. Only two networks experienced delay 
of just six percent.  While the detection of delay is a good start, there is not much to 
quantify from these two test runs.  However, from these runs, a correlation between 
current consumption and failures is observed.  Errors appear to start being reported when 
the current consumption is greater than 476 mA.  This relationship becomes the basis of 
Figure 14. Hyperterminal Report of Fault Injection Test 
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the third test.   
     In the third test, the chamber is heated up to 1100
     In this attempt, six of the networks report delay.  The most slowdown reported is 10% 
in Networks B, D, and E.  Just as in the first two experiments, Network D experiences 
delay longer than any other network.  A map of the FPGAs affected regions based on the 
thermal experimental data is illustrated in Figure 15.  The green blocks represent the 
networks reporting six percent delay while the red blocks represent the networks 
reporting 9.9 percent delay.  Most of the affected networks reside on the lower half of the 
FPGA. 
C while the ambient temperature and 
the current consumption are recorded every minute.  Once again, the errors begin once 
the current reaches 476 mA.  The current consumption more accurately reflects the 
FPGAs core temperature and represents the increase in current required to counter the 
increase in leakage current.  The core temperature is not calculated since the current is 
easier and more practical to obtain with the power supply.  The relationship between 
faults and current cannot be observed in the hyperterminal during the test since the 
outputs are printing out too fast to read because they are being reported in real time.  The 
comparison is made after the experiment by comparing the current/time profile with the 
timestamps of the faults reported.   
     Figure 16 depicts a graph of the system current draw versus time and temperature of 
the experiment.  The percent slowdown of Network D is profiled here.  The blue region 
indicates a detected delay fault, green indicates a six percent slowdown, and red indicates 
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a 9.9 percent slowdown.  The delays detected without a slowdown are those that appear 
in the report as a delay fault with a null delay value.  This happens when the initial 
analysis of all of the sensor networks uncovers a fault, but the individual sensor output 
comparisons are still reporting no faults.  The relationship between current and delay is 
taken one step further as each network starts to experience delay on the positive slope of 
the graph at the same current value that is stops experiencing delay on the negative slope 
within seven mA.  Even more convincing, is the degree of delay also shares the same 
Figure 15. Thermal Test Delay Distribution 
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current relationship on the positive and negative slopes of the current/time line.       
     The difference in network slowdown can be attributed to a number of factors.  Part of 
the intent of this research is to identify regions of the FPGA that may be more vulnerable 
to specific types of faults.  However, the results from the design analysis indicate that the 
difference in slowdown can be due to a difference in slack caused by wide variations in 
network implementation.  This may be the case for the six networks that detected faults at 
different currents, but does not explain why the rest of the networks did not detect any 
delay at all. In order for one network to report a 10% slowdown and an adjacent network 
reporting no delay, the difference in slack would have to be at least 1.3 ns.  While this 
difference is possible, it exceeds the theoretical maximum slack calculated in the 
Figure 14. Degree of Delay for Network D Based on Current Consumption 
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previous section and is unlikely.  The region of the FPGA may correlate with slowdown 
vulnerability, but several variables need to be addressed, such as non-reporting networks, 
non-sensor logic usage and clock slowdown before such a claim can be made.  
4.4 Heat Gun Results 
     The heat gun experiment is designed to take the temperature chamber one step further 
by exposing the DUT to conditions outside of its rated temperature range.  The extreme 
heat quickly penetrates the FPGA, causing delay faults within seconds.  All but two of 
the networks report delay.  Since the minimum reported slowdown is 16.3%, it is 
assumed that these two networks experience delay, even though it is not reported.  
Network 0 suffers the worst slowdown of 20.7%.  A graph of Network 0's percent 
Figure 15. Percent Slowdown vs. Temperature from Heat Gun Test 
 48 
slowdown over time is shown in Figure 17.  The maximum current draw reaches four 
amps when the device fails.  Despite reaching the point of failure, the board remains 
operational after it is cooled down and reprogrammed.  The current draw at room 
 temperature after this test has risen to 506 mA, indicating some permanent damage 
caused.  Delay was the only fault detected in this experiment.  
4.5 Optical Laser Results 
     With a quicker, more sensitive design that incorporates BRAM, the optical laser test 
from [3] is attempted again to record a bit flip generated by a laser as was accomplished 
in [21] as well as recording the location and duration of the bit flip.  Unfortunately, no 
faults are recorded.  Even three 50 mW lasers focused onto the same point on the FPGA 
did not induce a fault of any kind.  The current draw is also monitored in this experiment.  
After an hour of each level of laser intensity, the maximum change in current is only two 
mA; nowhere near the current increase noted to cause a delay fault in the temperature 
chamber.  The lack of results in this experiment can likely be due to the construction of 
the FPGA.  The impact of a laser would have to penetrate the layers of oxide and copper 
to reach the memory cells and logic blocks since the Virtex 4 is a flip chip design.  In an 
attempt to assist the laser with a more direct route to the transistors on the FPGA, the 
laser beam is aimed at an angle toward the side edge of the FPGA and even on the 
capacitors on the other side of the board.  After an hour of each attempt, it is determined 
that the CLBs and BRAM cells of the Virtex-4 are not affected by laser exposure.  
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4.6 Soldering Iron Results 
     The soldering iron test uncovers yet another aspect to consider involving the 
construction of the FPGA.  The expected result is to record faults in different regions 
when different corners of the FPGA are attacked by localized heat; in which case 
Networks 0, 1, D, and E would report delay for each of the corner attacks.  This result is 
not recorded.  Instead, the same networks report delay each time the soldering iron is 
applied.  When the corners on the left side of the FPGA are heated, Network 3 is the first 
to report delay while Network 6 reports first when the right side is heated.  This indicates 
that the location of the network has some impact.  However, the same four networks (3, 
6, 7, and D) report delay each time, regardless of the location being heated, indicating 
that there is another factor involved.  The maximum slowdown recorded in these test runs 
is only six percent, and the faults disappear almost immediately after the soldering iron is 
removed.  
      These unexpected results are likely due to the unaccounted for third dimension of the 
FPGA.  [24] describes the FPGA as a stack of up to 22 layers consisting of silica 
substrate between two plates of copper in which the traces and pads are etched out from.  
These layers are stacked on each other, separated with insulating substrate.  Additionally, 
there are planes of copper amongst the layers serving as power distribution areas.  With 
this information in mind, it is very likely that a localized heat source could penetrate to 
the first of these layers where the heat is dissipated over the entire two dimensional plane 
of the FPGA.  At this point, the networks that are routed closest to the surface will 
experience delay before those closer to the board.   
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     Table 5. Optical Flash Soft Error Points 
 
     The layers of the FPGA are connected with metal vias.  However, the majority of the 
localized, relatively weak heat is dissipated by the power plates.  Planahead does not 
account for the depth of the FPGA when allowing the user to place and route logic 
blocks.  It can therefore be assumed that the networks reporting delay in this particular 
experiment are placed toward the surface of the die.  This finding creates an 
inconsistency in modeling TID faults with heating experiments.  While the affects on 
leakage current and threshold voltage remain, the gradual ionizing properties would not 
transfer across the FPGA like heat does.  
4.7 Optical Flash Results 
Again, repeating experiments in [3] with a quicker, more robust system, the optical flash 
test is conducted.  However, once again, the desired results from this experiment are not 
achieved as no fault data is recorded.  Tests conducted with the heatspreader protecting 
the FPGA proves completely resistant to the Electrical Magnetic Interference (EMI) 
created even from the most powerful flash of 600W from as close as three inches away.  
Intensity (W) Soft Error 
Distance (cm) 
Logic SEU 
Observed? 
BRAM SEU 
Observed? 
TID 
Observed? 
18.5 None No No No 
35 7.5 No No No 
70 15 No No No 
140 15 No No No 
280 15 No No No 
560 22.5 No No No 
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No faults of any kind are detected, and the system continues to operate             
unaffected.  When the heatspreader is removed, the device's functionality is dependent 
upon the proximity and the intensity of the flash.  Table 6 contains the distance at which 
each of the intensities tested causes the FPGA to crash. 
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                                                        V. Conclusion 
 
     Overall, some interesting finds are uncovered in this research.  The system created in 
this research shows potential, but has a lot of improvements to be made before it can 
become the all-encompassing fault detection and characterization tool it was intended to 
be.  This section summarizes the contributions of this research, and some 
recommendations to future improvements that can be made to turn this system into a 
useful tool for FPGA usage in radiation-prone environments.  
5.1 Contributions 
     While a few organizations have created fault detection methods that either determine 
fault types, amount, or location, this research combines the two into one system.   It also 
provides fault data that is not being accounted for in other methodologies such as fault 
duration and delay.  Even though there are already automated fault reconfiguration 
systems being developed now, the addition of the methodology presented in this research 
will make them more robust and more effective. 
5.2 Future Work  
     There are several improvements and applications this design can be used for in future 
projects.  More effort needs to be devoted to the system design for it to become more 
useful in further experimentation and being implemented as a radiation detection system 
in operational uses.   
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5.2.1 Design. 
     A better understanding of the design properties will help improve this system 
immensely.  The delay and routing properties are somewhat of a mystery to most 
designers that do not have access to in-depth fabrication layouts.  Understanding the 
FPGA construction will make it easier to turn this system into a finely-tuned delay 
detection system.     
     5.2.2 Experimentation. 
     This system can be exposed to several radiation sources for fault characterization.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, SEUs can be induced by proton, neutron, heavy ion, and alpha 
exposure.  Preferably, the radiation could be centralized onto a small area of the FPGA so 
the location to be directly linked to a radiation-induced fault.  A mask could be made to 
shield all of the FPGA except the area to be irradiated.  The thickness of the shield should 
be thick enough to provide the right amount of stopping power for the selected source at 
the selected energy.  Protons and neutrons make the most sense for this testing as they are 
more readily available.  While alphas also fit into this category also, their energy level 
from common sources, such as Americium, is only around 5 MeV.  An alpha at this 
energy will penetrate 23 micrometers into silicon, not enough to cause a SEU. 
     Meanwhile a true TID experiment could be conducted to compare the results to the 
thermal experiment from this research.  It would be interesting to see if the same current 
usage to delay relationship exists with a true TID.  Gamma, x-ray, or electron radiation 
would be a good candidate for these tests.  The fault location methodology would not be 
tested, however, since the exposure of these sources is so uniform.  A mask would not 
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work in this case since a very thick and dense material would be needed that would be 
too difficult to punch a small hole through.  Although, an unmasked DUT would more 
accurately simulate radiation exposure in space. 
     5.2.3 Applications. 
     As mentioned previously, this sensor network can be implemented in conjunction with 
other applications on newer boards as a early warning system in the event of radiation 
threats.  Future iterations of this system can implement automated reconfigurations of the 
routed logic to avoid areas of the FPGA experiencing faults.  Additionally, an automated 
system clock can be controlled by the delay monitor, slowing down by the percentage of 
slowdown detected.  This system could be incorporated with the efforts described in [17], 
making it more accurate and robust.  After all, after the faults are characterized, the next 
step is to prevent, mitigate and correct them.   
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